A major work of legal and moral philosophy.

This study, written in an engaging style that reflects Nussbaum's concern to make philosophy accessible, contains a keen and erudite examination of the emotions of disgust and shame. . . . Getting to the root of what causes us disgust, shame and righteous anger forces us to clarify what we value. This is the task to which Nussbaum's study should inspire us.

[A] sophisticated exploration of how emotions enlarge or contract the nation's commitment to equal dignity for all. . . . Populists and communitarians will lock horns with legal theorists in the debates this book will provoke.

??any reader who approaches her book with views firmly set is likely to leave it with solid certainties somewhat shaken?. David Honigmann, Financial Times

This exciting book on emotions and the law tackles universal questions central to every legal system. We may pretend that law is a wholly rational discipline. We may try to tame strong emotions. But as Martha Nussbaum shows in her analysis of the passions that influence our attitude to law and its problems, we cannot deny our human feelings. Sometimes in the law, however, we strongly need to keep them in check. Intuition, in particular, is often wrong. Disgust is sometimes based on an infantile dislike of the unfamiliar.

[A] lucid and carefully argued new book.

Disgust and shame are problematic emotions that often appear to want to repudiate our basic, body-based humanity, Martha Nussbaum claims in this ambitious and timely book. . . . Nussbaum is by no means in favor of purging the law of all reference to emotion: she in fact makes an eloquent case for why this cannot and should not be done. . . . But there are some emotion---Nussbaum mentions jealousy as well as shame and disgust--that appear to offer an unreliable guide to human behavior, to risk calling up mere prejudice and social stigma instead of valid distinctions.

Nussbaum's work is rich and readable. To construct her argument she uses thick case studies and extensive research from a wide variety of literary, experimental, and sociological sources. She gives a fair hearing and fair treatment not only to her own liberal position and its accompanying conclusions but to those whose conclusions mark out strong disagreement with her.

Martha C. Nussbaum is the Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics in the Philosophy Department, Law School, and Divinity School at the University of Chicago. Her most recent book is "Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions".

Acknowledgments xiii

Introduction 1

I. Shame and Disgust: Confusion in Practice and Theory 1

II. Law without the Emotions? 5

III. Two Problematic Emotions 13

Chapter 1. Emotions and Law 19

I. Appeals to Emotion 20

II. Emotion and Belief, Emotion and Value 24

III. Emotions, Appraisal, and Moral Education 31

IV. Emotion and the "Reasonable Man": Manslaughter, Self-Defense 37

V. Emotions and Changing Social Norms 46

VI. Reasonable Sympathy: Compassion in Criminal Sentencing 48

VII. Emotions and Political Liberalism 56

VIII. How to Appraise Emotions 67

Chapter 2. Disgust and Our Animal Bodies 71

I. Disgust and Law 72

II. Pro-Disgust Arguments: Devlin, Kass, Miller, Kahan 75

III. The Cognitive Content of Disgust 87

IV. Disgust and Indignation 99

V. Projective Disgust and Group Subordination 107

VI. Disgust, Exclusion, Civilization 115

Chapter 3. Disgust and the Law 124

I. Disgust as Offense, Disgust as Criterion 125

II. Disgust and the Offender: The "Homosexual-Provocation" Defense 126

III. Disgust and the "Average Man": Obscenity 134

IV. Disgust as a Reason for Illegality: Sodomy, Necrophilia 147

V. Disgust and Nuisance Law 158

VI. Disgust and the Jury: "Horrible and Inhuman" Homicides 163

Chapter 4. Inscribing the Face: Shame and Stigma 172

I. The Blushing Face 173

II. Primitive Shame, Narcissism, and the "Golden Age" 177

III. The Refusal of Imperfection: The Case of B 189

IV. Shame and Its Relatives: Humiliation, Embarrassment 203

V. Shame and Its Relatives: Disgust, Guilt, Depression, Rage 206

VI. Constructive Shame? 211

VII. Stigma and Brand: Shame in Social Life 217

Chapter 5. Shaming Citizens? 222

I. Shame and the "Facilitating Environment" 223

II. Shame Penalties: Dignity and Narcissistic Rage 227

III. Shame and "Moral Panics": Gay Sex and "Animus" 250

IV. Moral Panics and Crime: The Gang Loitering Law 271

V. Mill's Conclusion by Another Route 278

Chapter 6. Protecting Citizens from Shame 280

I. Creating a Facilitating Environment 282

II. Shame and a Decent Living-Standard 282

III. Antidiscrimination, Hate Crimes 287

IV. Shame and Personal Privacy 296

V. Shame and People with Disabilities 305

Chapter 7. Liberalism without Hiding? 320

I. Political Liberalism, Disgust, and Shame 321

II. Mill's Defense of Liberty Reconsidered 322

III. The Case against Disgust and Shame 335

IV. Emotions and Forms of Liberalism 340

Notes 351

List of References 389

General Index 401

Index of Case Names 412